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ABSTRACT  
 
This study investigated the nature of pre-service teacher education students 
epistemological beliefs or beliefs about knowing. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with 29 students at QUT using an interview schedule similar to that used by 
Belenky et al. (1986). The interviews took place at the end of a year-long Graduate 
Diploma in Teacher Education course and were analysed using a descriptive-interpretativ 
e approach to data analysis. This means that although categories of beliefs emerged 
from the data, the descriptions of these categories were in uenced by the 
epistemological beliefs literature. The interview analysis showed that, as a group, 
students’ beliefs ranged from naõ¨ve beliefs in the reception of absolute truths to more 
sophisticated beliefs in the construction of reasoned truths. These categories were 
similar to those described by Perry (1970), Belenky et al (1986) and Baxter Magolda 
(1993). The categories of beliefs were also analysed in terms of structural aspects using 
the SOLO (Structure of Learning Outcomes) (Biggs & Collis,  1982, 1989) taxonomy as a 
guide. This part of the analysis was concerned with investigating how students’ 
responses were organised or structured. 
 
Background 
 
Over the past 30 years, within the student learning literature, there has been 
considerable research focused on how students go about learning. In particular, 
research related to students’ beliefs about learning and the interrelationships between 
such beliefs and their approaches to learning and learning outcomes (see, for 
example, Entwistle & Marton, 1984) has helped teacher educators to understand the 
nature of learning in tertiary settings. There is also another body of research that 
indicates that effective learning may be in uenced by a somewhat different set of 
beliefs. These are called epistemological beliefs and refer to beliefs individuals have 
about the nature and acquisition of knowledge (Bendixen, Dunkle, & Schraw, 
1994). 
 
William Perry (1970) . rst described epistemological beliefs in a longitudinal study 
of male college students. He documented the progress of students through four 
main epistemological positions, which he described as Dualism, Multiplism, Relativism 
and Commitment. Dualism refers to a set of beliefs that knowledge is 
comprised of absolute truths (right/wrong) that can be transmitted from experts. In 
the next position, Multiplism, individuals still hold some beliefs in knowledge as 
absolute truths but also acknowledge that some things can not be known with any 
certainty. Therefore, knowledge comprises both personal opinions and absolute 
truths. The next position described as Relativism constitutes a major shift in 
epistemological thinking because individuals believe knowledge is personally constructed 
and reasoned. Absolute truths can no longer exist because truth is considered 
to be relative to individuals ’ personal interpretations of experiences. These 
interpretations, however, are always validated and supported with evidence unlike 
the personal opinions referred to in the position of Multiplism. In the . nal positions 
related to Commitment, relativistic thinking is still a feature, but particular beliefs 
are more valued than others and are committed to in a  exible manner. 
Belenky et al. (1986) noted a sequence of epistemological development similar 
to that described by Perry (1970). A total of 135 females from academic and 
non-academic backgrounds were asked to respond to a number of open-ended 
questions, which were intended to re ect moral, cognitive and identity development. 
According to Belenky et al. (1986), there are . ve positions in the development of 
epistemological beliefs. These are Silence, Received (similar to Dualism), Subjective 
(similar to Multiplism), Procedural (similar to Relativism) and Constructed (similar 
to Commitment) ways of knowing. 
 
Using a sample of both male and female college students, Baxter Magolda (1993) 
postulated stages of epistemological development similar to those described by Perry 
(1970) and Belenky et al. (1986). Each year, over a seven-year period, more than 
100 college students were interviewed and completed short answer responses to 
open-ended questions on the Measure of Epistemological Re ections (Baxter 
Magolda, 1994). The positions are described as Absolute (similar to Perry’s Dualism), 
Transitional (similar to Perry’s Multiplism), Independent (similar to Perry’s 
Relativism) and Contextual (similar to Perry’s Commitment positions) knowing. 
Within each of the positions, Baxter Magolda (1988) described ways of knowing 
that differed for both genders. Relational modes of knowing are open,  exible, 
connected, responsive and considered more typical of women’s ways of knowing. 
Conversely, the impersonal or objective mode of knowing is often characterised by 
the use of logical, algorithmic procedures that result in separateness and abstraction 
(Baxter Magolda, 1993). 
 
There is debate within the epistemological beliefs literature regarding the 
appropriateness of developmental ideals such as Relativistic (Perry, 1970), Procedural 
(Belenky et al., 1986) and Independent (Baxter Magolda, 1994) ways of knowing 
(Goldberger, 1996a). It is possible that, in certain cultures, relativistic ways of 
knowing may not be appropriate (Goldberger, 1996a, 1996b). Goldberger, however, 
defended the superiority of such developmental ideals within the American context, 
which is characterised by multiple perspectives of knowing. Similarly, it could be 
argued that there is a need to be aware of, and re ect upon, multiple perspectives 
in an increasingly pluralistic Australian society. 
 
The extent to which epistemological beliefs can be considered to be a unidimensional 
set of beliefs has also been questioned. For example, Schommer (1990, 
1993a, 1993b) believes that epistemological beliefs are more likely to be characterised 
by a multidimensional set of more or less independent beliefs. This means that 
individuals may hold both sophisticated (more relativistic) and naõ¨ve (more dualistic) 
views about the nature of knowing. Schommer (1989, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) 
described . ve dimensions of epistemological beliefs that included (a) “omniscient 
authority” (beliefs in the source of knowledge), (b) “certain knowledge” (beliefs in 
the certainty of knowledge), (c) “simple knowledge” (beliefs in structure of knowledge), 
(d) “quick learning” (beliefs in the speed of learning), and (e) “innate ability” 
(beliefs in the stability of knowledge) (Schommer, 1990). In a questionnaire developed 
by Schommer over a series of studies (1989, 1990, 1993a, 1993b), four of 
these . ve dimensions have emerged as factors. These are “certain knowledge”, 
“simple knowledge”, “quick learning”, and “innate ability”. More recently, Schommer 
(1994) has conceptualised epistemological beliefs as a kind of frequency 
distribution where, for example, “sophisticated learners may believe a vast amount 
of knowledge is evolving, some knowledge is yet to be discovered, and a very small 
amount of knowledge is unchanging … On the other hand, naõ¨ve learners may 
believe a vast amount of information is certain, some knowledge is yet to be 
discovered, and a very small amount of knowledge is changing”. (Schommer, 1994, 
p. 302). 
 
Regardless of whether epistemological beliefs are characterised as a system of 
unidimensional or multidimensional beliefs, it appears that such beliefs are related 
to how individuals learn in tertiary settings. Schommer (1993a) and Ryan (1984) 
reported that the more students viewed knowledge as dualistic, the more likely they 
were to gauge their understanding based on factual standards. Students who 
believed that knowledge was constructed and reasoned were more likely to consider 
that understanding was based on developing meaning and application. Students who 
hold relativistic beliefs about the nature of knowledge are also more likely to be 
re ective about their own thinking rather than being focused on acquiring content. 
This ability to compare different ways of thinking allows students to see other 
peoples’ points of view (Perry, 1981). It also enables them to re ect on relationships 
between ideas so they can integrate information rather than maintaining unconnected 
pieces of information. 
 
Another point of contention in the current debate relates to whether epistemological 
beliefs are context speci. c in terms of domains of knowledge or generalisable 
across such domains. Mori (1997) found evidence to support the notion that 
epistemological beliefs are context speci. c rather than global. He examined the link 
between general epistemological beliefs and epistemological beliefs related to language 
learning in 97 college students who were engaged in the learning of Japanese 
and found that mostly these two dimensions were uncorrelated and independent of 
each other. Sheese and Radovanovic (1984) also interpreted a range of research to 
suggest that students may demonstrate more sophisticated epistemological beliefs in 
areas in which they have more prior knowledge. Beers (1988) and Roth and 
Roychoudhury (1994) also argued that such beliefs are more likely to be context 
speci. c. Conversely, Perry (1981) and Schommer and Walker (1995) contend that 
epistemological beliefs are likely to be held across a range of discipline areas, 
especially in the early college years when students are considered more dualistic or 
multiplistic in their thinking. King and Kitchener (1985), in their review of the 
literature, also stated that “academic major has not emerged as a powerful factor in 
understanding RJ [re ective judgement] development in the undergraduate years” 
(p. 30). 
 
Ruddick (1996) suggested that people draw on different epistemological beliefs in 
different contexts. However, she conceded that “prolonged focus on any of these 
kinds of inquiries may well produce cognitive capacities and attitudes that recur to 
different degrees in epistemologically dissimilar contexts” (pp. 254–255). Perry 
(1970) also described how individuals who have moved into the position categorised 
as Relativism might still have minimal beliefs in Dualism in certain contexts. He 
recognised that his positions re ected a dominant epistemological position and that 
individuals may have other ways of knowing. It is possible that, while context 
speci. c, epistemological beliefs may also be characterised by a dominant way of 
knowing that may emerge in many contexts. This is the position adopted in this 
study. 
 
So far the focus has been placed on the nature of epistemological beliefs but 
there is another dimension that has not been explored in the literature to date. 
Epistemological beliefs can be described in terms of the organisation or structure of 
such beliefs. The Structure of Observed Learning Outcomes (SOLO) taxonomy 
(Biggs, 1991; Biggs & Collis, 1982) is used in this study as a framework to 
investigate how epistemological beliefs are structured. The SOLO taxonomy was 
developed to evaluate, qualitatively, how students structure or organise learning 
outcomes or products. The categories of epistemological beliefs that emerged in this 
study could also be considered as outcomes or products of individual experiences. 
Biggs and Collis (1982) described . ve levels of outcomes ranging from incompetence 
to expertise. The . rst is the Prestructural level. Students at this level show 
no evidence of any knowledge related to the topic. The second level of response is 
Unistructural, which shows an understanding of and focus on one relevant aspect of 
the topic. The Multistructural or third level of response shows knowledge of several 
relevant independent aspects of knowledge. However, these aspects are not integrated 
into an overall structure: no relationship exists between the independent 
aspects. At the fourth level, Relational, the relevant aspects are integrated into an 
overall structure. The . fth and . nal level of response is the Extended Abstract level. 
 
At this level, integrated knowledge is generalised more abstractly to a new domain. 
The Relational and Extended Abstract responses demonstrate more sophisticated 
outcomes because of an increased differentiation and integration of aspects of 
learning. This means that students who evidence such structures are able to consider 
a range of issues and how these issues interconnect. The interrelationships are 
therefore critical in the development of sophisticated understanding. 
 
The current study investigated both the nature and structure of students’ epistemological 
beliefs with a view to further understanding the nature of learning in 
teacher education. In this study, epistemological beliefs refer to an individual’s 
dominant or default beliefs. Students were asked to comment on their epistemological 
beliefs in general. Therefore, it was expected that responses that were not 
focused on a speci. c domain of knowledge would be indicative of their default or 
dominant epistemological beliefs. This concept, as part of a critique of developmental 
theory, was explored in more detail above. 
 
The Study 
The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of epistemological beliefs held by 
29 teacher education students undertaking a year-long Graduate Diploma in Education. 
The course prepared individuals with undergraduate degrees to teach in 
primary schools in Queensland. As a group, students’ undergraduate degrees related 
to Business, Social Science, Leisure Management, Psychology, Visual and Performing 
Arts, Science, Literature, and Nursing. There were 3 males and 26 females with 
a mean age of 27 years. 
 
Students were interviewed about their epistemological beliefs at the end of the 
course using a semi-structured interview format. The interview questions related to 
epistemological beliefs were similar to those used by Belenky et al. (1986) in their 
study of women’s epistemological beliefs. The students were also asked to describe 
their beliefs about learning and teaching. The responses to the questions about 
learning and teaching provided further information about how students viewed the 
nature of knowledge. (See Appendix 1 for details of these questions.) The interviews 
took between 30 and 70 minutes with an average of approximately 60 minutes in 
duration. They were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. 
 
Analysis of the qualitative data was conducted using a predominantly inductive 
approach, which drew on relevant literature to interpret responses. This 
descriptiveinterpretative approach to analysis still made it possible to take account of 
many viewpoints before deriving “categories” of beliefs (cf. Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). 
The categories that emerged were audited by a second inquirer to establish 
trustworthiness and credibility (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). QSR NUD· IST (Non-numerical 
Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and Theorising) (Richards & 
Richards, 1994) was used to assist in the organisation of data emerging from the 
transcriptions of the audiotapes. 
 
Discussion of Results 
The comments made by students regarding their epistemological beliefs could be 
divided into three main categories: receive absolute truths (REC) beliefs, construct 
reasoned truths and receive absolute truths (CONREC), and construct reasoned 
truths (CON). These categories are described, exempli. ed and compared with 
existing epistemological belief schemes in Table 1. As noted earlier, these 
epistemological beliefs are considered to re ect to an individual’s dominant or default 
beliefs within wide-ranging academic contexts because students were asked to comment 
on their epistemological beliefs in general. 
 
Each of the categories will now be discussed in terms of the nature and structure 
of the associated epistemological beliefs. The examples provided in Table 1 show 
that, from the category of REC beliefs through to the category of CON beliefs, there 
is an increase in focus on beliefs that truth is constructed and reasoned and 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
corresponding decrease in focus on truths as absolute and received. REC beliefs 
present the most naõ¨ve perspective because individuals described truths as received 
and absolute only. In this category of beliefs, truths were considered to be transferable 
to individuals. There was only one student who described such beliefs. As 
indicated in Table 1, Perry (1970) described similar beliefs as Dualism, Belenky et 
al. (1986) as Received knowing, and Baxter Magolda (1993) as Absolute knowing. 
 
The category of REC beliefs could be described as representing a single set of 
beliefs. According to Biggs and Collis (1982), a Unistructural response indicates an 
understanding of, and focus on, one relevant aspect of the topic. Therefore, REC 
beliefs could also be described as having Unistructural organisation of beliefs 
because there is a single set of beliefs related to the reception of absolute truths. 
 
In the next category, CONREC beliefs, students (n 5 17) believed that some 
truths are constructed and reasoned, while other truths are absolute and received. 
However, the extent to which students focused on the constructed nature of truth 
varied between individuals . When asked to describe their views on the nature of 
truth, some students (n 5 3) acknowledged that individuals constructed personal 
truths that are supported with evidence and also described truths as absolute and 
transferable. They then continued to explain their views of learning and teaching in 
terms of reproductive (receiving knowledge from a teacher) approaches. Another 
group of students (n 5 14) categorised as having CONREC beliefs seemed to have 
a far greater focus on truth as constructed and reasoned throughout their interview 
responses. These students, for example, responded to the question “What is truth?” 
by indicating that individuals construct personal truths that are supported with 
evidence and then indicated views of learning and teaching as sometimes reproductive 
and sometimes constructed. To summarise, students coded as having 
 
CONREC beliefs described mixed beliefs that individuals construct reasoned truths 
and receive absolute truths. However, some students demonstrated stronger beliefs 
that individuals construct reasoned truths throughout their interview responses. 
Such mixed beliefs are not described in Perry’s (1970), Belenky et al’s. (1986), or 
Baxter Magolda’s (1993) schemes, which have been criticised for their stage-like, 
unidimensional characteristics (see, for example, Schommer, 1998a). This means 
that the positions described in each of these theories indicate a single set of beliefs 
and do not acknowledge that individuals may hold other types of beliefs. The 
category of CONREC beliefs included beliefs in multiple ways of knowing. These 
beliefs could be described as a Multistructural level of response because knowledge 
of at least two independent ways of knowing is displayed (cf. Biggs & Collis, 1982). 
There is no relationship evident between the various epistemological beliefs and no 
overarching, organisational structure. 
 
Finally, students (n 5 11) with CON beliefs were aware that truths are predominantly 
constructed and reasoned and in this analysis are considered to hold the most 
sophisticated set of epistemological beliefs. CON beliefs are also similar to the 
positions of Relativism (Perry, 1970, 1981), procedural knowing (Belenky et al., 
1986) and independent knowing (Baxter Magolda, 1993) as shown in Table 1. In 
this category, all beliefs about truth are organised by a single structure of Relativism. 
 
This means that even though an individual may have re ected on a view of 
knowledge that acknowledges absolute truths and opinions, these beliefs re ected an 
overall relativistic view of the nature of truth. For example, students who acknowledged 
that truths existed recognised that such absolutes could only exist for them 
personally because they were the product of their individual interpretations of the 
world. Therefore, CON beliefs seemed to have a Relational structural organisation 
because there was always a clear theme related to relativistic knowing that 
interconnected their beliefs. At a Relational level of organisation, the relevant aspects of 
learning are integrated into an overall structure (Biggs & Collis, 1982). 
 
All students, except for one, described at least some relativistic views about 
knowledge. Considering that these students were pursuing postgraduate 
quali. cations, this sophistication of beliefs is not surprising. Many researchers have 
suggested that tertiary education in uences epistemological development (Alexander 
& Dochy, 1995; Perry, 1981; Strange & King, 1981; King & Kitchener, 1994; 
Schommer, 1998b). An individual’s progress through tertiary studies is likely to be 
strongly in uenced by exposure to a variety of educational perspectives. Exposure to 
further education may cause cognitive con ict that results in the reconstruction of 
naõ¨ve epistemological beliefs into more sophisticated ways of knowing. However, it 
is possible that, in addition to educational experiences, life experiences (Belenky et 
al., 1986) and physical development may facilitate epistemological development 
although it is not clear exactly how each of these factors in uences epistemological 
beliefs (Schommer, 1998a). These are issues that need to be investigated in more 
detail. 
 
The structure or organisation of epistemological beliefs may have implications for 
teaching programs designed to develop epistemological beliefs. Teacher educators 
may need to encourage students to re ect on a variety of ways of knowing (increased 
differentiation of beliefs) and then to . nd ways to integrate those beliefs. This 
integration may involve . nding the “big ideas” (cf. Brooks & Brooks, 1993) that are 
common to all of their core beliefs. In this way students might be encouraged 
explicitly to develop Relational structures that connect their epistemological beliefs. 
 
Current debate is concerned with the question of superiority of Relativism as a 
developmental ideal (Goldberger, 1996a). By referring to the increasing differentiation 
and integration of core beliefs along a continuum, it is possible to assert that 
some ways of knowing are, indeed, more sophisticated than others. That is, a 
Relational organisation of core beliefs allows the individual to be cognisant of 
multiple perspectives, issues or topics but also allows them to see how such issues 
relate to each other. The progression from naõ¨ve to more sophisticated ways of 
knowing (and increased differentiation and integration) is therefore a desirable, 
adaptive process in the context of teaching in Australian primary schools. This 
progression is especially important in pluralistic educational contexts where interactions 
with a variety of students, colleagues and parents require  exibility and 
reasoned interpretations that are characteristic of relativistic thinking. 
 
Research suggests that teachers with more relativistic epistemological beliefs are 
more likely to be effective teachers. For example, Stuck (1984) claims that teachers 
with less sophisticated epistemological beliefs do not take students’ learning needs 
into consideration and have a limited repertoire of teaching strategies. Maor and 
Taylor (1995) observed that the effectiveness of computerised instruction in two 
high school science classrooms in Western Australia was related to the teachers’ 
epistemological beliefs rather than the programs themselves. That is, the teacher 
with relativistic beliefs was able to invoke more sophisticated thinking skills in 
students. Brody and Hill (1991) noted that teachers with more sophisticated 
epistemological beliefs used cooperative learning more effectively as a teaching 
strategy. Encouraging teachers to engage in postgraduate study may have implications 
for the development of more sophisticated epistemological beliefs and effective 
teaching in our schools. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Questions 
 
1. Beliefs about knowing 
How do you know when you know something? Sometimes people talk about “searching 
for truth”. I’m not sure what they’re talking about. What are your views? In learning 
about something you really want to know, what is the role of an expert? 
Probes 
How do you know someone is an expert? What do you feel and what do you do when 
experts disagree? What do you do if lecturers disagree? 
If experts disagree on something today, do you think that some day they will come to 
some agreement? Why or why not? How do you know what is right/true? 
Do you agree with this person who says that where there are no right answers anybody’s 
opinion is as good as another’s? Can you think of an opinion that you think is wrong? 
 
2. Beliefs about learning 
What is learning? 
How do you go about learning in general? 
How do you know when you have learnt something? 
 
3. Beliefs about teaching 
What is teaching? 
How do you go about teaching in general? 
How do you know when you have taught something? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
